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1095 
HOW DO THE COURTS CREATE POPULAR LEGITIMACY?: 
THE ROLE OF ESTABLISHING THE TRUTH, PUNISHING 
JUSTLY, AND/OR ACTING THROUGH JUST PROCEDURES 
Tom R. Tyler* & Justin Sevier** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When legal authorities evaluate the courts, their focus has 
traditionally been upon the degree to which the courts achieve two 
distinct objectives: establishing the truth and punishing justly.  
These two goals are not, of course, unrelated, since establishing the 
truth is often viewed as a precursor to determining just 
punishments.  A first concern of the system is with using the courts 
to draw upon investigative reports and evidence presented during 
trials to establish the facts of the case, that is, to determine as well 
as possible what actually happened.  These facts in turn address the 
second concern of the courts: justly punishing wrongdoing.  Hence, 
establishing truth and achieving substantive justice in punishment 
are two goals of the courts and are central to their evaluation by 
legal authorities and scholars.  To determine how well the courts 
achieve these objectives, scholars examine the frequency of 
erroneous verdicts1 and of punishments departing from objective 
standards of substantive justice.2 
A parallel social science literature considers the role of 
perceptions—about the degree to which court proceedings establish 
 
* Tom Tyler is Macklin-Fleming Professor of Law and Professor of Psychology, Yale 
University.  Ph.D. in psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Ph.D. (1978). 
** Associate Research Scholar, Yale Law School.  Visiting Assistant Professor, University 
of Illinois (2010-2012); Ph.D. in psychology, Yale (expected 2015); J.D., Harvard (2006). 
1 See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 6–13 (2011). 
2 See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 104–42 (1998).  Achieving substantive justice involves determining 
applicable laws, finding appropriate types of punishment, and applying general legal 
concepts, such as state of mind, reasonableness, or foreseeability to the facts determined in 
the case.  Cf. Nicholas Faso, Civil Disobedience in the Supreme Court: Retroactivity and the 
Compromise Between Formal and Substantive Justice, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2012) 
(―Substantive justice . . . involves a value judgment about the content of the law and its 
consequences.‖). 
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truth and deliver substantive justice—on public support for the 
courts.3  This literature considers the views of members of the 
public about the frequency of inaccurate verdicts,4 and the degree to 
which judicial punishments depart from public perceptions about 
substantive justice.5  These public views are then typically 
connected to the popular legitimacy of the courts.  This literature 
considers the influence of these issues upon public perceptions 
rather than evaluations of objective reality. 
Two models of popular legitimacy are developed and contrasted in 
this analysis.  Their validity is then tested using the results of a 
national survey of the American public.  The first model links 
popular legitimacy to the attainment of the goals of establishing 
truth and punishing justly.  The courts are expected to be viewed as 
legitimate to the degree that they achieve these objectives.  This 
goal-based model is contrasted with a second model, one which 
focuses upon the perceived fairness of court procedures.  The second 
model argues that by exercising legal authority through procedures 
that people see as fair, the courts gain legitimacy and popular 
support from the public.  This model is based upon the now 
substantial empirical literature linking popular legitimacy to public 
judgments about the procedural justice of the courts.6 
Beyond examining the influence of perceptions of procedural 
justice on popular legitimacy, this analysis will contrast two 
arguments about why procedural justice might be important in 
shaping popular legitimacy.  The first argument is that the public 
views about the use of fair procedures are linked to the attainment 
of truth and substantive justice.  From this perspective people’s 
widely demonstrated interest in the fairness of judicial procedures 
supports a goal attainment perspective on popular legitimacy.  
People use information about the fairness of court procedures to 
estimate the likelihood that the courts have determined the truth 
and punished justly. 
 
3 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and the Adversary System, 40 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 653, 668–685 (2007). 
4 See Robert J. MacCoun & Tom R. Tyler, The Basis of Citizens‟ Perceptions of the Criminal 
Jury: Procedural Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 336–51 
(1988).   
5 See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD 
BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 92–93 & n.165 (2008); PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, 
LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 13–
15 (2006). 
6 E.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW passim (2006). 
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An alternative model suggests that procedural justice is not 
influential because the public connects the use of fair procedures to 
the establishment of truth and/or the attainment of substantive 
justice.  Rather, the influence of procedural justice is linked to 
relational mechanisms linked to the enactment of procedural 
justice.  The relational model argues that people value the use of 
fair procedures because those procedures carry messages of status 
and inclusion which reinforce people’s identification with legal 
institutions and authorities and support their feelings of inclusion 
and status in the community.  This then leads to high self-worth 
and favorable self-esteem.  When people can present their concerns 
to judicial authorities and feel that those authorities consider and 
take account of their concerns, people’s identification with law and 
legal authorities is strengthened.  This is true both when people are 
in court and when they think about what they think would happen 
if they were to go to court.  This relational influence is distinct from 
the influence of goal-based judgments on popular legitimacy.  In 
other words, it is not linked to the belief that fair procedures lead to 
accurate verdicts or just sentences. 
In this study these two models—the goal based model and the 
relational model—are compared using the results of a nationally 
representative survey of Americans.  The results of this comparison 
suggest substantial support for the relational perspective on 
popular legitimacy.  To some degree court legitimacy is linked to the 
attainment of truth and the enactment of just punishments and 
using fair procedures is important because it is viewed as leading to 
these goals.  However, the strongest effect of procedural justice is a 
direct influence of public views about the procedural justice of the 
courts upon popular court legitimacy.  And further, as would be 
predicted by a relational model, that influence flows most strongly 
from the interpersonal component of procedural justice—that is, 
from judgments about the degree to which courts and judges are 
trustworthy and feel concern for members of the public—rather 
than being linked to how fairly the courts are seen as making 
decisions (i.e., to the degree to which they allow voice and exercise 
neutrality/impartiality in making decisions). 
These findings support a relational perspective on legitimacy and 
hence suggest the centrality of issues of inclusion and recognition in 
the relationship between the public and the courts.  By recognizing 
people and their concerns and through being viewed as including 
the public among those who have status in the eyes of the court, 
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relational links are created and strengthened.  These links in turn 
lead to legitimacy and cooperation, since people are motivated to 
accept and voluntarily defer to legal authority. 
In addition, the courts gain further popular legitimacy when they 
achieve two key public goals for the courts: determining truth and 
punishing justly.  This study suggests that public beliefs that the 
courts establish truth and punish justly are both important to 
legitimacy.  Interestingly, these two influences are separate and 
establishing truth does not build legitimacy because it is viewed as 
leading to substantive justice.7  Instead, it does so separately.  The 
results of this study suggest that public views about the degree to 
which the courts establish truth is the more important factor in 
shaping legitimacy when compared to how frequently they are 
viewed as sentencing justly.  Further, the goals of truth and 
substantive justice are linked in the public mind to different aspects 
of fair procedures.  Fair decision making is linked to delivering 
substantive justice; fair treatment to accuracy in verdicts. 
II.  SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE 
Traditionally, treatments of popular reactions to adjudication 
treat just punishment as the ultimate goal of a trial, with truth 
being an antecedent to the pursuit of substantive justice.  People 
have a fundamental desire to feel that there is just punishment in 
response to wrongdoing.8  A core feature of organized groups is that 
they create rules and enforce those rules by punishing those who 
break them.9  While societies differ widely in what their rules are 
and in how they punish those who transgress, punishment for rule 
breaking is central to the maintenance of social order and is found 
in all societies.10  The nature of these punishments and when they 
are enacted is the central focus of the study of retributive justice, 
which involves the principles defining appropriate punishments for 
wrongdoing.11 
 
7 For an argument that these issues are connected, see Michael Asimow, Popular Culture 
and the American Adversarial Ideology, in 7 LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 606, 609–10 
(Michael Freeman ed., 2005). 
8 Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for 
Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 297 (2002). 
9 See Ronald J. Rychlak, Society‟s Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the 
Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 303–05 (1990). 
10 See id. 
11 Kevin M. Carlsmith & John M. Darley, Psychological Aspects of Retributive Justice, 40 
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 193, 194 (2008). 
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It is a general characteristic of social relationships and organized 
groups that formal or informal rules develop that define appropriate 
conduct.  When such rules are violated, people feel the need to 
punish rule violators and this motivation does not only involve 
those personally harmed by wrongdoing.  Studies of retributive 
justice demonstrate that people are motivated to punish those who 
break rules and will incur personal costs to uphold social rules, even 
when they are not the victims of the rule breaking behavior.12 
A beginning element in reacting to rule breaking is an effort to 
restore the prior material balance between people.  The simplest 
way to do so is to right a wrong by compensating the victim(s) for 
harm done.  When people react to rule breaking which is judged to 
be unintentional or without malice, and where it is possible to do so, 
people often endorse such an approach to righting wrongs.  
However, when people are viewed as having deliberately broken 
rules, either intentionally or because of negligence, their victims 
and society more generally are found to feel that some type of 
punishment beyond compensating victims is appropriate.13  If 
someone hits a person, they do not just hit them back, they hit them 
harder, reflecting an additional punishment for rule breaking. 
Studies exploring the nature of the motivation to punish often 
link punishment to issues of deterrence and incapacitation.14  It is 
argued that people punish to prevent future wrongdoing.15  Other 
studies suggest that the desire for revenge is a key issue.16  Recent 
studies have suggested that, on the contrary, people’s primary 
reason for punishing is to uphold societal values.17  Rule breaking is 
viewed as a threat to those values, and appropriate punishment 
restores the integrity of those values.  A consequence of this view is 
that those people whose actions and demeanor show a defiance of or 
disrespect for society, social values, and/or the social status of their 
victims are both more likely to be punished, and likely to be 
punished more severely.  How does this desire to punish wrongdoers 
relate to the search for truth?  In the legal system itself, truth is 
seen as a precursor to establishing just punishment.  In the popular 
 
12 See Carlsmith et al., supra note 8, at 297. 
13 See John M. Darley & Thane S. Pittman, The Psychology of Compensatory and 
Retributive Justice, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 324, 327–28 (2003). 
14 E.g., ROBINSON, supra note 5, at 75–83, 110–12. 
15 E.g., id. at 75, 110–12. 
16 See, e.g., Carlsmith & Darley, supra note 11, at 197. 
17 See, e.g., Rychlak, supra note 9, at 331–32. 
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mind the relationship between truth and punishment is less clear. 
The punishment literature suggests that appropriate punishment 
(i.e., punishment linked to an accurate understanding of the wrong 
committed) is important, but shows equally clearly that people’s 
desire to see justice done sometimes leads to loose or even 
nonexistent standards of truth, leading to the punishment of 
scapegoats who may have at best a marginal relationship to the 
wrongdoing in question.  More particularly, people do not always 
see the procedures that best attain the goals of truth and justice as 
being the same.  Hence, feeling that justice has been done can be 
viewed as a distinct goal from finding truth. 
The separation of justice from truth is inherent in the uncertainty 
associated with trials.  It is unusual for fact finders to know the 
truth.  Defendants deny guilt, and witnesses and evidence are 
contradictory and confusing.  Hence, truth is typically uncertain.  
Yet decision makers must dispense punishment.  Hence, justice is 
done in the face of uncertainty about truth.  Given this fundamental 
point it is easy to see how standards of truth could vary depending 
upon the motivation to feel that substantive justice has been done 
because someone has been punished for a crime. 
III.  PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
Recent social science research suggests that subjective judgments 
about the procedural justice of the courts play a central role in 
public evaluations of the legitimacy of the courts.18  In other words, 
people are strongly influenced by whether or not they feel that the 
court system and its authorities exercise their legal authority in fair 
ways.  The same studies further demonstrate that such popular 
legitimacy is important because it shapes deference to legal 
authorities, cooperation with and support for legal authorities, as 
well as everyday compliance with the law.19 
While the courts have long recognized the importance of 
exercising legal authority through procedures that, on objective 
grounds, are fair,20 discussions of perceived procedural fairness are 
more recent.  The roots of the application of ideas of subjective 
 
18 See TYLER, supra note 6, at 8, 105. 
19 See id. at 161. 
20 See D.J. GALLIGAN, DUE PROCESS AND FAIR PROCEDURES: A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURES 204–05 (1996). 
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procedural justice lie in the work of Thibaut and Walker.21  These 
authors both articulate a theory of perceived procedural justice and 
establish its importance through a program of experimental 
research.  Their work has inspired a large body of research on the 
police, the courts, and corrections that continues to this day.  That 
research demonstrates both the value and the viability of a new 
strategy for exercising judicial authority based upon a self-
regulatory approach.  This new strategy focuses upon building and 
maintaining popular legitimacy as a way of encouraging the 
acceptance of judicial authority, heightening deference, lowering the 
rate of long-term noncompliance and enhancing public willingness 
to cooperate with the courts in fighting crime by, for example, being 
a juror or a witness when the courts are prosecuting criminals. 
Studies link judgments about procedural justice directly to a 
variety of law related behaviors, including immediate decision 
acceptance or rejection;22 decision adherence over time;23 rule 
 
21 See JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS passim (1975). 
22 See JOHN D. MCCLUSKEY, POLICE REQUESTS FOR COMPLIANCE: COERCIVE AND 
PROCEDURALLY JUST TACTICS 30 (2003); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: 
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 55 (2002); John C. Besley, 
Public Engagement and the Impact of Fairness Perceptions on Decision Favorability and 
Acceptance, 32 SCI. COMM. 256, 257–63 (2010); Christine E.W. Bond & David John Gow, 
Policing the Beat: The Experience in Toowoomba, Queensland, in POLICING FOR PREVENTION: 
REDUCING CRIME, PUBLIC INTOXICATION AND INJURY 153, 161 (Ross Homel ed., 1997); 
Mengyan Dai et al., Procedural Justice During Police-Citizen Encounters: The Effects of 
Process-Based Policing on Citizen Compliance and Demeanor, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 159, 159–61 
(2011); E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution: Using Procedural 
Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 224–31 (1993); Stephen D. Mastrofski 
et al., Compliance on Demand: The Public‟s Response to Specific Police Requests, 33 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 269, 269–80 (1996); Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Police Disrespect Toward 
the Public: An Encounter-Based Analysis, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 519, 519–22 (2002); Kristina 
Murphy & Tom Tyler, Procedural Justice and Compliance Behaviour: The Mediating Role of 
Emotions, 38 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 652, 652–55 (2008); Alex R. Piquero et al., Discerning 
Unfairness Where Others May Not: Low Self-Control and Unfair Sanction Perceptions, 42 
CRIMINOLOGY 699, 699–711 (2004); Clifford Stott et al., „Keeping the Peace‟: Social Identity, 
Procedural Justice and the Policing of Football Crowds, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 381, 381–83 
(2012); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the 
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 233–38 (2008); Jeffrey 
T. Ward et al., Caught in Their Own Speed Trap: The Intersection of Speed Enforcement 
Policy, Police Legitimacy, and Decision Acceptance, 14 POLICE Q. 251, 252–57 (2011); Amy C. 
Watson & Beth Angell, The Role of Stigma and Uncertainty in Moderating the Effect of 
Procedural Justice on Cooperation and Resistance in Police Encounters with Persons with 
Mental Illnesses, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 30, 30–33 (2013); Tom R. Tyler et al., Street 
Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men‟s Legal Socialization, 
1–5 (Yale Law School, Public Working Paper No. 302, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2289244; ROBERT J. MACCOUN ET AL., 
THE INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ALTERNATIVE ADJUDICATION: AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW 
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breaking behavior;24 well-being and recovery;25 and cooperation with 
the police, courts, and school officials.26 
Further research demonstrates that public judgments about the 
legitimacy of the courts and the police are linked to the perceived 
procedural justice of their policies and practices.  If legal authorities 
are believed to be exercising their authority fairly, they gain 
legitimacy.  This basic relationship has been repeatedly confirmed 
in studies of interactions among the courts,27 the police28 and the 
 
JERSEY AUTOMOBILE ARBITRATION PROGRAM 70–71 (1988), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/ 
rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3676.pdf. 
23 See Robert E. Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Parents‟ 
Satisfaction and Functioning One Year After Settlement, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 124, 124 (1994). 
24 See David M. Bierie, Procedural Justice and Prison Violence: Examining Complaints 
Among Federal Inmates (2000–2007), 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 15, 15–19 (2013); Anthony 
E. Bottoms, Interpersonal Violence and Social Order in Prisons, 26 CRIME & JUST. 205, 205–
13 (1999); Michael R. Brubacher et al., Procedural Justice in Resolving Family Disputes: 
Implications for Childhood Bullying, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 149, 149–55 (2009); 
Michael D. Reisig & Gorazd Mesko, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Prisoner Misconduct, 
15 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 41, 41–45 (2009); Joseph R. Tatar II et al., Perceptions of Procedural 
Justice Among Female Offenders: Time Does Not Heal All Wounds, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 268, 268–71 (2012); Alan J. Tomkins et al., An Experiment in the Law: Studying a 
Technique to Reduce Failure to Appear in Court, 48 CT. REV. 96, 96–98 (2012); Tyler et al., 
Street Stops and Police Legitimacy: Teachable Moments in Young Urban Men‟s Legal 
Socialization, supra note 22, at 8–11; Heathcote W. Wales et al., Procedural Justice and the 
Mental Health Court Judge‟s Role in Reducing Recidivism, 33 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 265, 
265–67 (2010); CYNTHIA G. LEE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, A COMMUNITY COURT 
GROWS IN BROOKLYN: A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE 
CENTER 1–4 (2013), http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/A-Community-
Court-Grows-in-Brooklyn.pdf; LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., AUSTL. FED. POLICE & AUSTL. 
NAT’L UNIV., EXPERIMENTS IN RESTORATIVE POLICING: A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE 
CANBERRA REINTEGRATIVE SHAMING EXPERIMENTS (RISE) i–iv (1998), http://www.aic.gov.au/ 
media_library/aic/rjustice/rise/progress/1998.pdf.  
25 See JO-ANNE M. WEMMERS, DUTCH RESEARCH & DOCUMENTATION CTR., VICTIMS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (1996); Sarah Kopelovich et al., Procedural Justice in Mental 
Health Courts: Judicial Practices, Participant Perceptions, and Outcomes Related to Mental 
Health Recovery, 36 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 113, 113–14 (2013); Jo-Anne Wemmers, Victims‟ 
Experiences in the Criminal Justice System and Their Recovery from Crime, 19 INT’L REV. 
VICTIMOLOGY 221, 221–23 (2013). 
26 See Eve M. Brank et al., Will They Tell? Weapons Reporting by Middle-School Youth, 5 
YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 125, 125–26 (2007); Denise C. Gottfredson et al., How Drug 
Treatment Courts Work: An Analysis of Mediators, 44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 3–11 (2007); 
Anne Gregory & Rhona S. Weinstein, The Discipline Gap and African Americans: Defiance or 
Cooperation in the High School Classroom, 46 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 455, 455–59 (2008); Lindsey 
E. Wylie et al., Assessing School and Student Predictors of Weapons Reporting, 8 YOUTH 
VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 351, 351–57 (2010); Tyler & Fagan, supra note 22, at 262–63; Tyler et 
al., supra note 22, at 9. 
27 See STEPHEN SHUTE ET AL., A FAIR HEARING?: ETHNIC MINORITIES IN THE CRIMINAL 
COURTS 71–78 (2005); Ben Bradford, Voice, Neutrality and Respect: Use of Victim Support 
Services, Procedural Fairness and Confidence in the Criminal Justice System, 11 
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 345, 346, 362 (2011); Katherine M. Kitzmann & Robert E. 
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public.  And, again, studies that directly compare the police and the 
courts suggest that procedural justice underlies legitimacy with 
both authorities.29 
Legitimacy in turn is linked to desirable law related behavior.  
The first concern of the courts is with public acceptance of their role 
as the authorities responsible for maintaining order.  This involves 
empowering the courts to manage legal problems and accepting 
 
Emery, Procedural Justice and Parents‟ Satisfaction in a Field Study of Child Custody 
Dispute Resolution, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 553, 554–63 (1993); Avishalom Tor et al., 
Fairness and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL LEGAL STUD. 
97, 109 (2010); RASHIDA ABUWALA & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, THE 
EFFECTS OF THE HARLEM HOUSING COURT ON TENANT PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE 15 (2008), 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/Harlem_Housing_Court_Study.pdf; DONALD 
J. FAROLE, JR., CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, THE NEW YORK STATE RESIDENTS SURVEY: PUBLIC 
PERCEPTIONS OF NEW YORK’S COURTS 16–17 (2007), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/ 
default/files/documents/NYS_Residents_Survey.pdf. 
28 See TYLER & HUO, supra note 22, at 56–57; TYLER, supra note 6, at 63; WEMMERS, supra 
note 25, at 198; Kimberly Belvedere et al., Explaining Suspect Resistance in Police-Citizen 
Encounters, 30 CRIM. JUST. REV. 30, 33–42 (2005); Irina Elliott et al., Procedural Justice in 
Contacts with the Police: The Perspective of Victims of Crime, 13 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 437, 
438–46 (2012); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, ―One Question Before You Get Gone . . .”: 
Consent Search Requests as a Threat to Perceived Stop Legitimacy, 2 RACE & JUST. 250, 268 
(2012); Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance 
Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men‟s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUST. Q. 255, 
256–57, 262–73 (2010); Badi Hasisi & David Weisburd, Going Beyond Ascribed Identities: The 
Importance of Procedural Justice in Airport Security Screening in Israel, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
867, 885–86 (2011); Lyn Hinds, Building Police-Youth Relationships: The Importance of 
Procedural Justice, 7 YOUTH JUST. 195, 195–203 (2007); Lyn Hinds & Kristina Murphy, 
Public Satisfaction with Police: Using Procedural Justice to Improve Police Legitimacy, 40 
AUSTRALIAN & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 27, 28–39 (2007); Lyn Hinds, Youth, Police Legitimacy 
and Informal Contact, 24 J. POLICE & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 10, 10–19 (2009); Tal Jonathan-Zamir  
& David Weisburd, The Effects of Security Threats on Antecedents of Police Legitimacy: 
Findings from a Quasi-Experiment in Israel, 50 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 4–20 (2013); 
Tammy Rinehart Kochel, Can Police Legitimacy Promote Collective Efficacy?, 29 JUST. Q. 384, 
386–414 (2012); Lorraine Mazerolle et al., Shaping Citizen Perceptions of Police Legitimacy: A 
Randomized Field Trial of Procedural Justice, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 33, 40–55 (2013); Andy 
Myhill & Ben Bradford, Can Police Enhance Public Confidence by Improving Quality of 
Service? Results from Two Surveys in England and Wales, 22 POLICING & SOC’Y 397, 398–419 
(2012); Jennifer Norman, Seen and Not Heard: Young People‟s Perceptions of the Police, 3 
POLICING 364, 365–71 (2009); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice 
and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513 passim 
(2003); Ralph B. Taylor & Brian A. Lawton, An Integrated Contextual Model of Confidence in 
Local Police, 15 POLICE Q. 414 passim (2012); Tyler & Fagan, supra note 22, at 264; Tom R. 
Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions 
of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253 passim (2004); Tom R. 
Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do Majority and Minority 
Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215 passim 
(2001); Michael D. Reisig et al., Compliance with the Law in Slovenia: The Role of Procedural 
Justice and Police Legitimacy, EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL’Y & RES. (published online 2013), 
http://link.springer.com/journal/10610. 
29 See TYLER & HUO, supra note 22, at 206–07. 
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their discretionary decisions about how to enforce the law.  When 
people have disputes or conflicts with others they can either turn to 
the legal system, for redress, or they can engage in private 
vengeance.  Studies show that people are more likely to defer to the 
courts concerning conflict management and rule enforcement if they 
believe the courts and the law are legitimate.30  A second concern is 
with behavior that undermines state institutions or authorities such 
as riots and rebellions.  Legitimacy also lessens willingness to 
engage in such actions.31 
Further, those people who view the law as legitimate are more 
likely to follow the law in their everyday lives.  This includes the 
widespread variety of laws that shape people’s behavior: traffic 
laws, laws against stealing, regulations against buying illegal 
items, laws against drug use, or laws against robbery, murder and 
assault.  In addition to the general influence of legitimacy on rule 
adherence, an additional concern is how people respond when they 
have personal interactions with the courts or the police.  People can 
either comply with judicial decisions and directives or they can 
resist and avoid them. 
A particular problem for legal authorities is that people change 
their behavior in the presence of the judge and then revert to their 
original behavior when they leave the courthouse, requiring the 
courts to deal repeatedly with the same people and problems.  
Studies indicate that people are both more likely to obey law and to 
accept decisions when they view the courts as legitimate.  This 
includes ordinary citizens following the laws and accepting 
decisions related to rule breaking, disputes and misdemeanors,32 
 
30 See Nicole E. Haas et al., Public Support for Vigilantism, Confidence in Police and Police 
Responsiveness, 24 POLICING & SOC’Y 224, 227–35 (2014); Jonathan Jackson et al., 
Monopolizing Force? Police Legitimacy and Public Attitudes toward the Acceptability of 
Violence, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 479, 479–80, 490–91 (2013); Sunshine & Tyler, supra 
note 28, at 534; Justice Tankebe, Self-Help, Policing, and Procedural Justice: Ghanaian 
Vigilantism and the Rule of Law, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 245, 247–60 (2009); Tom R. Tyler & 
Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating 
Compliance, Cooperation and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 78, 89 (2014). 
31 Ronald Fischer et al., Support for Resistance Among Iraqi Students: An Exploratory 
Study, 30 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 167, 169–73 (2008); Katrin Hohl et al., The Effect 
of the 2011 London Disorder on Public Opinion of Police and Attitudes Towards Crime, 
Disorder, and Sentencing, 7 POLICING 12, 13–20 (2013); Jonathan Jackson et al., supra note 
30, at 481, 490–91; Gary LaFree & Nancy A. Morris, Does Legitimacy Matter?: Attitudes 
Toward Anti-American Violence in Egypt, Morocco, and Indonesia, 58 CRIME & DELINQ. 689, 
711–12 (2012); Tyler & Jackson, supra note 30, at 89. 
32 See, e.g., JONATHAN JACKSON ET AL., JUST AUTHORITY?: TRUST IN THE POLICY IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES 12 (2013); TYLER & HUO, supra note 22, at 107–08; TYLER, supra note 
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and criminals involved in felony level behaviors.33  While the focus 
of these studies involves both the courts and the police, direct 
comparisons of these authorities suggests that the findings of 
research on them are similar.34 
A.  What is Procedural Justice? 
What elements of procedures shape the judgments that people make 
about the procedures’ fairness?  Studies suggest that members of the 
public have complex models of procedural justice, often considering eight 
or more distinct justice issues when deciding how fair they think a legal 
procedure is.  Four issues are typically found to be important: 
opportunities for participation, a neutral forum, trustworthy 
authorities, and treatment with dignity and respect.  Blader and 
 
6, at 57; Rebecca M. Chory-Assad & Michelle L. Paulsel, Classroom Justice: Student 
Aggression and Resistance as Reactions to Perceived Unfairness, 53 COMM. EDUC. 253, 265 
(2004); Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and Adolescents, 18 
SOC. JUST. RES. 217, 236 (2005); Jonathan Jackson et al., Why Do People Comply with the 
Law? Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions, 52 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1051, 1062 
(2012); Margaret Levi et al., The Reasons for Compliance with Law, in UNDERSTANDING 
SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 70, 90 (Ryan Goodman et al., eds., 2012); Brian 
C. Martinson et al., Scientists‟ Perceptions of Organizational Justice and Self-Reported 
Misbehaviors, 1 J. EMPIRICAL RES. HUM. RES. ETHICS 51, 61 (2006); Kristina Murphy et al., 
Nurturing Regulatory Compliance: Is Procedural Justice Effective when People Question the 
Legitimacy of the Law?, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 18 (2009); Kristina Murphy, Regulating 
More Effectively: The Relationship between Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Tax Non-
compliance, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 562, 575–76 (2005); Kristina Murphy, The Role of Trust in 
Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 187, 203–04 
(2004); Reisig et al., supra note 28; Jennifer Stuart et al., Procedural Justice in Family 
Conflict Resolution and Deviant Peer Group Involvement Among Adolescents: The Mediating 
Influence of Peer Conflict, 37 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 674, 683 (2008); Sunshine & Tyler, 
supra note 28, at 535; Tyler & Jackson, supra note 30, at 89; Tom R. Tyler et al., 
Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and Recidivism: The Engagement of Offenders‟ 
Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE Drinking-and-Driving Experiment, 41 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 553, 568 (2007); Marius van Dijke & Peter Verboon, Trust in Authorities as a 
Boundary Condition to Procedural Fairness Effects on Tax Compliance, 31 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 
80, 87 (2010); Michael Wenzel, A Letter from the Tax Office: Compliance Effects of 
Informational and Interpersonal Justice, 19 SOC. JUST. RES. 345, 358 (2006). 
33 See, e.g., RICHARD SPARKS ET AL., PRISONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 303 (1996); 
Jeffrey Fagan & Alex R. Piquero, Rational Choice and Developmental Influences on 
Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 715, 739–41 
(2007); Robert J. Kane, Compromised Police Legitimacy as a Predictor of Violent Crime in 
Structurally Disadvantaged Communities, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 469, 490–91 (2005); Andrew V. 
Papachristos et al., Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223, 236, 266 (2007); Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Criminology: 
Why Do Criminals Obey the Law? The Influence of Legitimacy and Social Networks on Active 
Gun Offenders, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 412, 436 (2012); Michael D. Reisig, Rates 
of Disorder in Higher-Custody State Prisons: A Comparative Analysis of Managerial Practices, 
44 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 229, 230, 232, 239 (1998); Reisig & Mesko, supra note 24, at 55. 
34 TYLER & HUO, supra note 22, at 175; Tyler & Jackson, supra note 30, at 89. 
1095_TYLER AND SEVIER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/8/2014  1:02 AM 
1106 Albany Law Review [Vol. 77.3 
 
Tyler refer to the first two elements as involving the quality of 
decision making, while the latter two elements are concerned with 
the quality of interpersonal treatment.35 
First, people want to participate in decisions about the resolution 
of problems or the application of rules.  When dealing with 
authorities this typically means that people want to have an 
opportunity to explain their situation or tell their side of the story 
before decisions are made and outcomes determined.  This 
opportunity to make arguments and present evidence should occur 
before the police or judges make decisions about what to do.  People 
are interested in having an opportunity to tell their story, that is, 
they want to have a voice. 
Second, people react to evidence that the authorities with whom 
they are dealing are neutral.  This requires an explanation for the 
process and accountability in terms of the rules used to make 
decisions.  Neutrality involves authorities making decisions based 
upon consistently applied legal principles and the facts of the case, 
not personal opinions and biases.  Transparency or openness about 
what the rules and procedures are and how decisions are being 
made facilitates the belief that decision making procedures are 
neutral when it reveals that decisions are being made in rule based 
and unbiased ways.  If, for example, the police have a policy of stops 
to search cars for guns, they explain to the people they stop what 
that policy is and the reasons the police have adopted it.  When 
judges apply the law and make decisions, they explain what laws 
are being used and how they apply. 
Third, people want to have their status as human beings and 
members of the political community acknowledged.  Since quality of 
treatment is a statement about status, people are sensitive to 
whether they are treated with dignity and politeness, and to 
whether their rights as members of the community are respected.  
The issue of interpersonal treatment consistently emerges as a key 
factor in reactions to dealings with legal authorities.  People believe 
that they are entitled to treatment with respect and react very 
negatively to dismissive or demeaning interpersonal treatment. 
Finally, people focus on cues that communicate information about 
the intentions and character of the legal authorities with whom 
 
35 Steven L. Blader & Tom R. Tyler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: 
Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” Process, 29 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 748, 757 
(2003). 
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they are dealing.  This involves inferences of integrity, 
trustworthiness, and good faith.  People react favorably to the 
judgment that the authorities with whom they are interacting are 
benevolent and caring, and are sincerely trying to do what is best 
for the people with whom they are dealing.  Authorities 
communicate this type of concern when they listen to people’s 
accounts and explain or justify their actions in ways that show an 
awareness of and sensitivity to people’s needs and concerns.  In 
discussions about whether or not to accept a directive from a legal 
authority each of these concerns is typically more important in decisions 
than are assessments of the fairness or favorability of the decision 
itself.36 
Of these four elements, the first two—giving people voice and 
using neutral rules when making decisions—have been associated 
with attaining the goal of substantive justice.  Allowing voice and 
making rule based impartial decisions lead to appropriate findings 
of fact and encourage punishing justly.  The latter two elements, 
respect and trust, are relational issues and have been associated 
with the influence of procedures upon the social connection between 
people and authorities.37  They reflect the influence of court 
proceedings upon understandings of inclusion and status, and hence 
directly speak to the potential of wrongdoing to injure the status of 
victims or others in society. 
IV.  TRUTH AND SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE 
How do procedural justice findings relate to establishing the truth 
and enacting substantive justice in punishment for wrongdoing?  
Procedural justice findings suggest that using fair procedures 
benefits legal authorities in a variety of ways.  However, procedural 
justice research has not generally addressed the degree to which it 
is important to the public to believe that the courts reach accurate 
verdicts and/or punish offenders appropriately.  It is not clear 
whether procedures matter because people think that the use of fair 
procedures enhances the likelihood of achieving these objectives.  
While procedural justice assessments concern evaluations of how 
 
36 TYLER & HUO, supra note 22, at 90. 
37 TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, 
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT 89–90 (2000); Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. 
Blader, The Group Engagement Model: Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and Cooperative 
Behavior, 7 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 349, 351–52 (2003). 
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the court exercises authority they are not necessarily linked to 
either the accuracy of verdicts or the appropriateness of 
punishments. 
There are two issues underlying this question.  The first is 
whether the pursuit of truth and enactment of substantive justice 
are viewed by people as the same, that is, is attaining truth related 
to the substantive justice of punishments?  The second is whether 
either of these issues is connected by the public to evaluations of the 
procedural fairness of the courts and through such judgments to 
evaluations about court legitimacy. 
A.  Truth and Justice: The Same? 
As has been noted, it would be natural to assume that people 
value fair procedures because they view them as leading to accurate 
verdicts and/or to the appropriate punishment of wrongdoing.  This 
assumption guides at least some of the early procedural justice 
research of Thibaut and Walker on adversarial versus inquisitorial 
trial procedures.38  Thibaut and Walker argue that the adversarial 
system is more likely to produce truth and lead to justice.39  It is 
also the system most likely to be viewed by litigants as procedurally 
just and by implication legitimate.40 
In their studies, Thibaut and Walker first demonstrate that the 
effects of prior bias on verdicts are better eliminated by the 
adversarial procedure.41  In experiments they first create pre-trial 
bias and then conduct an adversarial or inquisitorial trial 
concerning a particular case.42  They find that the influence of prior 
bias upon post-trial verdicts is less when the trial is adversarial.43  
Based upon this finding they suggest that the use of adversary 
procedures is associated with actual accuracy, as well as flowing 
from the trial procedure that people evaluate as being the fairest, 
which is also the adversary system.44 
While this argument would initially seem reasonable, it is itself 
inconsistent with another aspect of Thibaut and Walker’s research 
findings.  In a different experimental framework they show that the 
 
38 See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 21, at 39–40. 
39 See id. at 119. 
40 See id. at 77. 
41 See id. at 49. 
42 See id. at 42–45. 
43 See id. at 49. 
44 See id. at 118. 
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adversarial system leads to a distribution in the presentation of 
facts in a trial that does not accurately reflect the totality of the 
facts in the underlying case.  In particular they demonstrate that 
the proportion of evidence presented at a trial favors the 
disadvantaged party under the adversarial model, while under the 
inquisitorial model the evidence presented accurately mirrors the 
―true‖ nature of the actual evidence.45  Although Thibaut and 
Walker present this feature of the adversarial model as desirable, it 
also indicates that the model is not associated with attaining truth, 
if truth flows from having the underlying mix of the ―true‖ evidence 
accurately presented during the trial.  In this situation, therefore 
the same ―fair‖ adversarial procedure is potentially associated with 
inaccuracy. 
The model articulated by Thibaut and Walker additionally 
suggests that the adversarial system is the most likely to deliver 
just punishments.46  While this aspect in their model is not tested 
empirically, their theoretical model suggests that adversarial 
procedures are viewed by people as fairer in part because they 
increase the likelihood that the decision maker will make an 
appropriate substantive decision, that is, will punish appropriately.  
According to their model, the litigant’s goal in a trial is to provide 
evidence to the decision maker in an effort to shape his/her verdict, 
not to win, but to see that that verdict represents a fair outcome 
(―distributive‖ or ―substantive‖ justice).47  The adversarial trial 
provides the best chance to do that because the litigant controls the 
presentation of evidence.  Because they are provided more of an 
opportunity to communicate evidence to the decision maker in their 
own way, litigants are more likely to be able to present the evidence 
that is important, leading to a greater likelihood of a just verdict. 
Since Thibaut and Walker argue that adversary procedures lead 
to truth and produce substantive justice in terms of punishment, 
the goals of attaining truth and realizing substantive justice are 
aligned and result from the same procedural choice.  Of course, as 
has been noted, the issue of which procedure attains truth is more 
complex in the Thibaut and Walker paradigm than they 
acknowledge, but in the authors’ own terms truth and justice are 
aligned and can be pursued using the same procedure.  Moreover, 
 
45 See id. at 40. 
46 Id. at 118. 
47 See id. 
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that procedure is viewed as procedurally fair by the people involved. 
The findings of research by Austin and Tobiasen suggest a less 
clear connection between accuracy and perceived fairness, 
however.48  These authors found that people associate different legal 
procedures with the goals of accuracy and justice.  They believe that 
the adversarial system is most likely to lead to justice, the 
inquisitorial system to truth.  Having made this distinction, people 
then indicate a preference for the adversarial system and, 
apparently, for substantive justice over truth. 
In their later work on science courts, Thibaut and Walker adopt a 
posture that is consistent with these findings.49  They suggest that 
the courts adopt a two-stage procedure for resolving science 
disputes.50  In stage one the courts would use an inquisitorial 
procedure to achieve truth.  In stage two, subsequent to and based 
upon stage one facts, the courts would bring the facts into an 
adversarial trial to achieve justice in the courts’ decisions.51 
This conception of science courts receives support in the work of 
Sevier,52 who found that the American ―adversarial‖ model of 
resolving legal disputes—in which a person involved in litigation 
hires her own attorney to advocate for her in front of a judge or 
jury—is perceived by American litigants as providing more justice 
than it does accuracy, whereas the ―inquisitorial‖ model of resolving 
legal disputes, favored by foreign countries—in which attorneys 
have little control over the flow of evidence and are not hired as 
biased advocates by the litigants—is perceived by litigants as more 
accurate than it is just.53 
Taken as a whole these various studies suggest that it is difficult 
to make a clear statement about the relationship among preference 
for a judicial procedure (adversarial or inquisitorial); public views 
about the fairness of that procedure; public judgments about the 
likelihood that a particular procedure will achieve truth; and public 
evaluations of the likelihood that a particular procedure will lead to 
 
48 William Austin & Joyce M. Tobiasen, Legal Justice and the Psychology of Conflict 
Resolution, in THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 227, 251–52 
(Robert Folger ed., 1984). 
49 John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV 541, 563 (1978). 
50 Id. at 563–65. 
51 Id. at 563 & n.68. 
52 Justin Sevier, The Truth-Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and 
Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 212, 220 (2014).  
53 See id. at 220.   
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appropriate punishments (substantive justice).  In particular, these 
studies do not explore whether the impact of using procedures that 
people view as fair upon legitimacy occurs because the public thinks 
either that such fair procedures are more likely to produce truth or 
that they are more likely to produce substantive justice or for both 
reasons. 
B.  Procedural Justice and Court Legitimacy 
This paper compares the two models outlined, models which 
differently describe the connection among procedural justice, truth, 
and substantive justice as well as their joint connection to court 
legitimacy.  The first model is drawn from Thibaut and Walker and 
suggests that the impact of procedural justice upon legitimacy 
occurs because the public believes that fairer procedures are more 
likely to produce truth and lead to substantive justice.  A second 
model also views procedural justice as important to legitimacy but 
not because it is related to either the ability of the courts to 
determine truth or to produce substantive justice.  Instead, the 
value of fair procedures is linked to the relational mechanisms of 
procedural justice that underlie at least some procedural justice 
influences. 
V.  RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
Procedural justice is potentially valuable to the success of 
authorities because it relies upon relational mechanisms.  In other 
words, its influence is not only related to showing people that 
accepting judicial authority is good because it leads to higher 
quality outcomes.  To an extent, fair procedures matter in the public 
calculus because they are associated with truth and substantive 
justice, producing a goal-linked influence. 
Fair procedures are also influential for relational reasons.  When 
people are treated fairly by authorities they develop a social 
connection with them, identifying with the authority and viewing 
the authority as sharing their goals and values.  These non-outcome 
based connections have been labeled relational bonds and shown to 
be a basis for the voluntary acceptance of regulation leading to 
enforcement through self-regulation.54  The relational approach to 
 
54 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 27 (1992). 
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regulation is based upon a psychological model—the relational 
model55—that explains why these elements are effective.  Relational 
bonds can be created through personal interactions or via general 
judgments about the nature of authorities and institutions. 
From a motivational point of view relational mechanisms are 
especially important when it is difficult to effectively build 
legitimacy by producing desired outcomes.  Courts are such a 
setting since a judge can seldom provide all the parties with what 
they want or feel they deserve.  Instead, they sometimes have to 
deny claims or refuse judgments.  Building adherence through 
procedural justice principles is particularly useful in such 
situations, that is, settings in which outcome based approaches 
have been proven insufficient or unfeasible.  When people cannot 
receive desired outcomes relational mechanisms are vital since they 
anchor adherence to a judicial decision, to the type of the 
relationship people have with judicial authorities and not to their 
pursuit of desired outcomes.  The relational elements of fair 
procedures direct attention toward those elements of a procedure 
that can be experienced by everyone and in conjunction with 
winning or losing: respect from authorities and evidence that 
authorities are sincere, benevolent and concerned (i.e., trustworthy).  
Procedural justice is hence effective in legal settings through its 
relational capacity to affirm the social connection between 
individuals and authorities and thereby motivate the person to act 
based upon identity related motivations, making their evaluation of 
their outcome secondary to their acceptance decision. 
The advantage of bringing disputes to the courts is that judicial 
authorities are more neutral and disinterested.  So they can more 
effectively overcome the problems of self-interested motivation that 
make it difficult for the parties involved in a dispute to implement 
distributive justice rules and create acceptable agreements or for 
those who feel wronged to determine appropriate punishments.  
Judges are also less emotionally involved and can make better 
decisions about suitable resolutions to disputes and punishments 
for rule breaking. 
A neutral authority can establish the principles defining a fair 
sentence.  And having a clear standard of right and wrong 
articulated by an authority encourages the parties to accept this 
 
55 Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 139–43 (1992). 
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punishment.  This is true of the perpetrator, the victim, and the 
community.  Hence, having a third party authority facilitate a 
socially superior form of resolution to that which occurs when 
private parties seek vengeance—that is, establishment of judicially 
appropriate punishment—is less likely to create bad feeling and 
undermine long-term relationships.  People are also less likely to 
act upon extralegal motivations of retaliation and revenge when a 
legitimate authority is telling them in a clear manner what a fair 
punishment is. 
Why is it better for the parties not to act on self-serving 
motivations but to accept the decisions made by a judge?  While 
acting on one’s personal views about a dispute and engaging in 
vengeance may be psychologically satisfying to one party it 
undermines social relationships because it leaves an aggrieved 
victim of that revenge, who has family and friends of their own, 
even if it is comforting to the original victim.  Society favors just 
punishment as a way to create closure, so the ability of authorities 
to encourage it is desirable.  Private actions are also undertaken in 
the ―heat of the moment‖ when the truth is still unclear, and they 
may not reflect a reasonable level of punishment.  Actions taken in 
the heat of the moment are often excessive and result in a 
motivation to take counteraction, which leads to a cycle of violence. 
Further, judges can also use their expertise and experience to 
craft just punishments that are more complex and effective than 
what parties might develop themselves.  These decisions can be 
better informed and more thoughtful.  Studies suggest that judges 
do in fact use their positions to make more complex decisions than 
lay parties.56  Hence, it is not surprising that one commonly chosen 
approach that groups adopt to determine ―fair‖ approaches to 
punishment is to bring their dispute to a court and then let the 
judge or other expert decide.  This provides a mechanism through 
which justice principles can operate in complex situations.57 
Consider the recent example of the efforts of Kenneth Feinberg to 
allocate resources to the families of the victims of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks; or the people living in the Gulf, whose lives were damaged 
by the BP oil spill; or the bankers whose compensation was partially 
controlled by the government.  In each case an expert developed a 
 
56 See Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective Restraint in Social Dilemmas: Procedural 
Justice and Social Identification Effects on Support for Authorities, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 482, 483–84 (1995). 
57 See id. at 484–95. 
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complex application of distributive justice rules to determine the 
best compensation for those wronged.58 
Judicial authorities are valuable as the disinterested and 
knowledgeable adjudicators of wrongdoing.  They can help to 
resolve the problems that occur when interested parties try to 
implement rules of fairness in the face of victimization.  However, 
the introduction of judicial authorities raises the issue of whether 
and when people will actually defer to those authorities and view 
their decisions as appropriate, right, and proper.  Having 
empowered authorities, people have to decide when to view their 
decisions as legitimate and accept them.  The flip side of judicial 
discretion is the possibility of public mistrust.  Discretion based 
differentiations in sentences for similar crimes, for example, carry 
the risk of undermining trust and confidence in authorities, 
especially when people suspect the motives that lead to differences 
in punishment across individuals.  Authorities, in other words, have 
to compellingly explain and justify varying sentences based upon 
the circumstances of the crime or criminal. 
If our concern is with the legitimacy of the courts and their ability 
to gain acceptance for more of the complex decisions that they can 
provide, the focus should be on the procedural justice of formal and 
informal legal procedures because, as noted, studies suggest that 
people give legitimacy to authorities when they believe that they 
are exercising their authority fairly.  This provides an important 
indication about how authorities can gain acceptance: they can 
provide evidence that they are using fair procedures.  And while 
procedural justice involves elements of both fair decision making 
and elements of fair interpersonal treatment, it is the quality of 
treatment which is relational in nature that is especially important 
from the point of view of facilitating cooperation.59 
The goal-based model emphasizes that fair decision making leads 
to higher quality decisions and for this reason may facilitate 
decision acceptance.  People are more likely to think that truth is 
frequently established and substantive justice often achieved, so 
they are more likely to support the courts.  If, for example, the 
authority can determine a fair verdict (truth) and establish 
appropriate punishment (substantive justice), the parties are more 
 
58 KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO 
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 151–57 (2005). 
59 See Tyler & Lind, supra note 55, at 165. 
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willing to accept their decisions, and if the public thinks the courts 
have these properties they are more likely to defer to the courts, 
allowing them to determine fair punishments.  In this case, 
decisions are accepted because judicial decisions are understood to 
be reasonable in that truth has been established and justice 
achieved. 
The other key to success however, is relational: people are willing 
to defer to the solutions judicial authorities propose in part because 
the authority acts in ways that validate the parties by showing 
respect for their status and standing in the group, displaying 
concern for and consideration of their views, and expressing a desire 
to do what is right for the people with whom they are dealing.  
People therefore feel that the authority is trustworthy, sincere, and 
benevolently motivated.60  Relational elements are distinct from the 
nature and quality of the decision itself and are a separate aspect of 
procedural justice related to the parties’ social link with the 
authority.  For example, Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler found gains 
in the willingness to accept negotiated outcomes that are linked to 
the fairness of the negotiation process even though the outcomes 
themselves are not materially better.61 
The relational element is especially important from the 
perspective of society because it enhances the acceptance of the 
authorities’ decisions and thereby facilitates cooperation.  When a 
person cannot receive the outcome they want concerning 
punishment of a wrongdoer, they can still feel validated by the 
authority in relational terms and this relational basis for exercising 
authority is therefore a mechanism that can enhance the level of 
cooperation and acceptance when judges face difficult decisions and 
cannot give one or both parties outcomes that they will view as 
appropriate. 
When people have a social link with an authority, the justice of 
the procedures the authority uses become the key issue they 
consider when deciding whether or not to accept the decisions of 
that authority.  Such a link can be at the individual level, for 
example the connection a person feels with a judge or mediator, and 
it can be more institutional, with people identifying with 
institutions because of their legitimacy.  When people lack such a 
 
60 See TYLER & HUO, supra note 22, at 7. 
61 See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: 
Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
473, 491 (2008). 
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relationship they focus on whether they agree with a third-party 
decision.  Within people’s procedural justice evaluations, relational 
issues in particular are more central. 
The stronger the social links between a party and an authority 
the more the party’s behavior in relationship to that authority is 
shaped by relational as opposed to outcome based issues.  
Consequently, part of being an effective authority, judicial or 
otherwise, is being able to draw upon social bonds with the parties 
who deal with the courts, as well as with the public that observes or 
reads about the courts.  These are not necessarily personal 
connections but reflect identification on the part of the parties with 
the role and institution represented by the judge, the courts, and 
the law. 
To summarize, relationally based procedural justice is valuable 
because it provides a basis for authorities to gain acceptance for 
their decisions as well as a mechanism for building institutional 
legitimacy.  Authorities are neutral and have expertise.  They can 
use these characteristics to craft more complex justice-based 
solutions.  But, will those solutions be accepted?  The authorities 
have to balance their ability to make more complex applications of 
justice rules using their discretionary authority against being able 
to get acceptance for their decisions both among the parties involved 
and people more generally. 
How do authorities use justice to legitimate more complex 
decisions among all the parties to an interaction?  Decisions that 
depart from commonsense justice, even if they are more complex 
and reflect expertise and experience, are initially likely to be viewed 
as unfair by the parties.  Studies suggest that the parties defer to 
such decisions when they perceive that the authority is acting with 
the intention of achieving justice—for example, a relational 
concern.62  In other words, the key to effectiveness is that people 
have trust in the motives and sincerity of the authority.  Authorities 
can depart from commonly understood principles of justice when 
people support them for relational reasons. 
How do authorities communicate trustworthiness and create 
trust?  Two ways are, first, by explaining what the procedures they 
are using are and why they are making the decisions they do and, 
second, by acknowledging people’s needs and concerns in those 
 
62 Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the 
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC. REV. 103, 129 (1988). 
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explanations.  To do so it is first important to let people present 
their concerns and evidence they feel is relevant so that these can 
both be used in making a decision and in justifying it. 
Hence, the study of justice in the context of authorities needs to 
consider how authorities make their decisions legitimate to all the 
parties to a conflict so that they accept them.  And of particular 
concern in this analysis, does legitimation involve issues of truth 
and substantive justice or do relational effects occur outside of any 
connection between viewing the courts as using fair procedures, 
thinking that they do determine the truth and do punish justly, and 
viewing them as legitimate institutions. 
Thibaut & Walker argue that a benefit of providing voice is that it 
enables authorities to arrive at substantively fair solutions.63  
However, their work does not show that it is because people think 
that solutions reached through fair procedures are substantively 
fairer that they accept them.  In their studies, Thibaut and Walker 
do not link the perceived substantive fairness of third-party 
decisions to their legitimacy and acceptance.  Hence, there is a need 
to distinguish the issue of producing fair sentences from that of 
engaging relational mechanisms and to consider the role of both 
mechanisms in producing legitimacy. 
These issues are important because they focus on the potential 
benefits that accrue from having trained and experienced 
authorities who can craft high quality solutions.  The ability of 
experts to gain deference because of the quality of their decisions is 
different from their ability to gain acceptance for decisions via 
relational mechanisms.  However both are relevant to the benefits 
derived from creating and empowering authorities.  Americans, in 
particular, have a love-hate relationship with experts and expertise 
and often seem to feel that the views of the ―average person on the 
street‖ are the best basis for action. 
VI.  THE PRESENT STUDY 
The focus of concern in this study is popular legitimacy.  Drawing 
upon the literature on legitimacy, this study operationalized 
popular legitimacy in terms of four elements: the perceived 
obligation to obey the courts; trust and confidence in the courts; 
judgments about whether the courts follow the law; and the belief 
 
63 See THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 21, at 118. 
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that legal authorities have the same normative values as the public.  
The study also measured legitimacy in terms of two behaviors: the 
willingness to testify in trials and the willingness to forego private 
vengeance. 
This analysis examines the relationship between public 
judgments about the degree to which the courts establish truth, the 
frequency with which judicial decisions reflect substantive justice in 
terms of punishment, the fairness of court procedures, and the 
legitimacy of the courts.  Those relationships are explored among a 
random sample of Americans. 
A.  Sample Characteristics 
Participants for this study were drawn from a panel of 
compensated respondents maintained by Knowledge Networks 
during August and September 2012.64  Individuals in the panel were 
offered the opportunity to complete this survey as part of their long-
term commitment to the organization.  The research panel 
comprised a probability sample of U.S. residents that was acquired 
through random digit dialling and address-based sampling 
methodologies of online and offline adults over the age of eighteen.  
Selected respondents were contacted by e-mail and provided with a 
laptop computer and internet access if needed.  For this survey 2561 
respondents randomly chosen from the larger ongoing panel of 
residents of the United States maintained by Knowledge Networks 
were invited to take part in the survey and reminded after three 
days.65  Of those who might participate, 1603 individuals completed 
the survey either in English or in Spanish, which represented a 
62.5% response rate. 
The sample was 48% male.  Twenty-one percent of respondents 
were twenty-nine years of age or younger; 26% of respondents were 
between thirty and forty-four years old; 28% of respondents were 
between forty-five and fifty years old; and 26% respondents of were 
sixty years of age or older.  In terms of education, 30% of the sample 
had completed some high school or had a high school degree; 29% of 
respondents had completed some college; and 29% of respondents 
 
64 Knowledge Networks is a survey research firm, which maintains a panel of respondents 
who complete online questionnaires for compensation.  The panel is designed, with 
appropriate weighting, to approximate the demographics of the American population.  See 
KnowledgePanel Design Summary, GFK, 2, http://goo.gl/qhHs2d (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
65 This number was chosen to produce an adequate number of completed questionnaires. 
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were college graduates or had received additional education.  In 
terms of income, 36% of responses had an annual family income 
below $40,000; 33% of the sample had an annual family income 
between $40,000 and $84,000; and 31% of the sample had an annual 
family income $85,000 or more.  The sample was 6% Hispanic; 12% 
African American; 72% White; and 10% other ethnicity.  Finally, 
41% of the sample participants were Republican; 55% were 
Democratic; and 4% were undecided. 
The panel sample is designed to approximate a national sample 
and the responses received were weighted to adjust for deviations 
from a representative national sample.66  This adjustment involved 
weighting respondents’ questionnaires based upon their 
demographic characteristics including gender, age, ethnicity, 
education, income, region, and primary language.  The weighted 
sample, which consisted of 1603 participants, should therefore 
approximate a representative sample of American adults.67 
Each of the participants in the study answered a series of 
questions about the courts presented to them on a series of 
computer screens.  Participants were allowed to complete the survey 
in multiple sessions, but could not return to previous questions in 
the questionnaire. 
B.  Participants‟ Responses 
We now report the data that we collected from our participants.  
The sections that follow list each of the questions that we asked to 
our participants and are organized by topic.  Participants were 
asked their views about (1) certain characteristics of the courts; (2) 
their attitudes toward the courts; and (3) their behavior with 
respect to the courts. 
 
66 The comparison data is drawn from the Current Population Survey, with Hispanic data 
drawn from the 2010 PEW Hispanic Center Survey.  See generally Current Population Survey 
(CPS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032013/perinc/ 
toc.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (compiling and making available for download the 2012 
CPS data sets); PEW RESEARCH CENTER, HISPANIC TRENDS PROJECT 2010 (Feb. 21, 2010), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/02/PHC-2010-FB-Profile-Final_APR-3.pdf (compiling 
data from the 2010 Pew Hispanic Center Survey). 
67 A comparison of the sample to 2012 Current Population demographics indicated no 
significant deviations.  See Current Population Survey, supra note 66.  For example, in 2012 
the U.S. population was 72% White, and our survey panel was 72% White; the U.S. 
population was 51% female, as was the sample; and, in 2010, 37% of the US population was 
age eighteen to fourty-four, as was the sample.  Id. 
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1.  Characteristics of Courts 
We asked our participants several questions relevant to their 
perceptions of certain characteristics of American courts: (1) the 
procedural justice produced by the courts; (2) the frequency with 
which the courts arrive at correct, true verdicts; and (3) the 
substantive justice produced by the courts. 
a.  The Procedural Justice of the Courts 
The first of the characteristics of American courts—the amount of 
procedural justice that they produce—can be conceived of in terms 
of their decision making and in terms of the fairness of their 
interactional treatment of litigants.  We asked participants 
questions regarding both of these conceptions of procedural justice. 
i.  Procedural Justice in Terms of Decision-Making 
Participants answered the following four questions using a four-
point scale, anchored at ―never‖ and ―always.‖  The first question 
measured the psychological construct of voice, whereas the 
remaining questions measured participants’ perceptions of 
neutrality.  They were asked how often the courts: (1) ―Give people a 
chance to tell their side of the story before they decide what to do‖; 
(2) ―Make fair and impartial decisions in the cases they deal with‖; 
(3) ―Explain their decisions and actions in ways that people can 
understand‖; and (4) ―Make decisions based upon the law and not 
their personal biases or opinions.‖68 
ii.  Procedural Justice in Terms of the Fairness of Treatment by the 
Courts 
Participants answered these questions using a four-point scale 
(from ―never‖ to ―always‖).  The first two questions measured 
participants’ perceptions of the amount of respect they had received 
and the final two questions measured the degree of trust they have 
 
68 Participants’ responses to these items were strongly correlated.  This correlation is 
measured through a ―Cronbach’s alpha‖ statistic, in which a value of 1.0 indicates a perfect 
correlation between responses.  See ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 
299 (2010); Karl Schweizer, On the Changing Role of Cronbach‟s α in the Evaluation of the 
Quality of a Measure, 27 EUR. J. PSYCH. ASSESSMENT 143, 143–44 (2011).  The Cronbach’s 
alpha value for these four items was .84. 
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in the courts.  The questions specifically asked how often the courts: 
(1) ―Treat people with dignity and respect‖; (2) ―Respect people’s 
rights‖; (3) ―Try to do what is best for the people they are dealing 
with‖; and (4) ―Make decisions that are good for everyone in the 
community.‖69 
b.  Frequency with which the Courts Reach Accurate Verdicts 
(Truth) 
Participants answered two questions on the same four-point scale 
used above.  The questions asked how often the courts: (1) ―Make 
mistakes and let guilty people go free?‖; and (2) ―Make mistakes and 
convict innocent people?‖70 
c.  Frequency with which the Courts Sentence Appropriately 
(Substantive Justice) 
Participants were asked five questions on a four-point scale 
anchored at ―disagree‖ and ―agree.‖  (1) ―People who break the law 
should be given harsher sentences than they currently receive‖; (2) 
―I support the death penalty for serious crimes‖; (3) ―The use of 
harsh punishments should be avoided as much as possible‖; (4) ―If 
prison is used it should be used sparingly and as a last resort‖; (5) 
―Whenever possible we should use community service as an 
alternative to prison.‖71 
2.  Court Related Attitudes 
We measured our participants’ attitudes toward the courts with 
respect to how legitimate they perceive those courts to be.  
Legitimacy is a multidimensional psychological construct and so we 
measured it as outlined below. 
 
69 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .94, indicating that they were highly 
correlated. 
70 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .81, indicating that they were highly 
correlated. 
71 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .73, indicating that they were highly 
correlated.  Additionally, items three and four were ―reverse scored,‖ whereby the values 
associated with moving from ―disagree‖ to ―agree‖ in coding each participants’ responses were 
reversed to account for the fact that the items were ―negatively worded‖ questions.  The 
Cronbach’s alpha value reflects the association among these items after items two, three, and 
four were reverse coded.  See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 68, at 299. 
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a.  Legitimacy of the Courts 
The analysis in this section treats legitimacy as a general 
summary index that averages participants’ responses to questions 
regarding (1) their sense of obligation to obey the courts; (2) their 
trust and confidence in the courts; and (3) normative alignment, 
which we measured by examining participants’ perceptions of 
whether the courts follow the law and whether they share the 
public’s values. 
i.  Legitimacy: Obligation to Obey the Courts 
Participants were asked the extent to which: (1) ―You should 
support the decisions made by judges even when you disagree with 
them‖; (2) ―You should do what judges tell you even if you do not 
understand or agree with the reasons‖; (3) ―You should do what 
judges tell you even if you do not like how they treat you‖; and (4) 
―The courts in your community are legitimate authorities and you 
should obey them.‖72 
ii.  Legitimacy: Trust and Confidence in the Courts 
Respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed that: (1) ―The courts protect the interests of the rich and 
powerful above those of ordinary people‖; (2) ―The courts are unduly 
influenced by pressure from political parties and politicians‖; (3) 
―Judges take bribes‖; (4) ―Judges put people in jail for no good 
reason‖; (5) ―Judges make decisions based upon their prejudices or 
personal opinions‖; and (6) ―When judges make decisions they 
almost always behave according to the law.‖73 
iii.  Normative Alignment 
Do the courts follow the law?  Participants were asked the extent 
to which they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: 
―When judges make decisions they almost always behave according 
to the law.‖ 
Do the courts share public values?  Participants were asked the 
 
72 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .83, indicating that they were highly 
correlated. 
73 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .82, indicating that they were highly 
correlated.  Items one, two, three, four and five were reverse scored. 
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extent to which they agreed or disagreed with two statements: (1) 
―Judges stand up for the values that are important to you‖; and (2) 
―Judges generally have the same sense of right and wrong that you 
do.‖74 
3.  Court Related Behavior 
We measured participants’ reports of their behaviors with respect 
to the courts by asking them (1) the degree to which they would 
help legal actors; (2) the degree to which they would take actions 
―outside the law‖; and (3) several questions regarding their actual 
experiences with the law, if applicable. 
a.  Help the Legal System 
On a four-point scale ranging from ―very unlikely‖ to ―very likely,‖ 
participants were asked: (1) ―If you saw someone push a person to 
the ground and steal their purse or wallet, how likely would you be 
to call the police?‖; (2) ―If you were the only witness, how willing 
would you be to identify the person who committed the crime?‖; and 
(3) ―If you were the only witness, how likely would you give evidence 
in court against the accused?‖75 
b.  Violence as Revenge and Protest 
On a four-point scale ranging from ―very wrong‖ to ―not wrong at 
all,‖ participants were asked how wrong it was to take actions 
outside the law, specifically the appropriateness of using violence to: 
(1) ―Take revenge against someone who has insulted or injured you‖; 
(2) ―Resolve a dispute with a neighbor‖; (3) ―Protest against laws or 
policies that you think are unjust‖; (4) ―Write or distribute leaflets 
encouraging violence against people of different ethnic groups‖; (5) 
―Use violence to protest against economic policies‖; and (6) ―Use 
violence to promote a particular religion or religious cause.‖76 
 
74 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .88, indicating that they were highly 
correlated. 
75 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .93, indicating that they were highly 
correlated. 
76 The Cronbach’s alpha value for these items was .85, indicating that they were highly 
correlated. 
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c.  Personal Experience with the Courts 
To determine whether participants had any personal experiences 
with the courts over the past two years, we asked them: (1) ―Have 
you been a defendant in a court case in which you were accused of a 
crime?‖; (2) ―Have you been in court because you were a victim of or 
witnessed a crime?‖; and (3) ―Have you been in court because you 
went to get help resolving a conflict or to collect money you felt 
another person owed you?‖  Six percent of respondents responded 
yes to the first question, and 3% of respondents responded yes to the 
second question and to the third question.  These participants were 
then asked additional questions regarding the justice of the 
decision-making in their case, the fairness of the way the court 
treated them, and the perceived lawfulness of the outcome. 
i.  Justice of Decision Making 
Here, participants were asked, on a five-point scale ranging from 
―very unfairly‖ to ―very fairly‖: ―How fairly did the court make 
decisions about what to do?‖ 
ii.  Fairness of Interpersonal Treatment 
On the same scale, participants were also asked: ―How fairly were 
you treated by the court?‖ 
iii.  Lawfulness of Outcome 
Finally, on a five-point scale ranging from ―not at all‖ to 
―completely,‖ participants were asked: ―To what extent did you 
receive the right outcome based upon your understanding of the 
law?‖ 
Because participants’ responses to questions in each subcategory 
listed above were highly correlated with each other, we averaged 
participants’ responses to questions in each subcategory to create 
scales that represent the relevant psychological construct.  The next 
section analyzes the survey results based on those scales. 
VII.  RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY 
To examine the relationship between the key issues of concern in 
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this study, we can first look at the correlation among the variables 
measured.77  These correlations are shown in Table 1.  First, they 
indicate that judgments about whether the courts obtain accuracy 
and whether they dispense substantive justice are unrelated.78  The 
correlations further suggest that people associate using fair 
procedures with both producing more accurate verdicts79 and as 
leading to more appropriate sentencing (i.e., substantive justice).80 
We can also consider the relationship among different aspects of 
popular legitimacy.  As shown in Table 2, consideration of their 
correlation indicates that legitimacy (as reflected in obligation and 
trust/confidence), lawfulness, and shared community values are 
interrelated views about the courts.  In addition, those who would 
help by testifying are also more likely to say that they would not go 
outside the law to resolve individual or collective grievances.  
Finally, both behaviors are linked to attitudinal expressions of 
popular legitimacy. 
To examine the basis of public support for the courts we first 
examine the influence of procedural justice, verdict accuracy, and 
sentence appropriateness upon legitimacy and behavioral support 
for the courts.  The regression analysis examining that relationship 
is shown in Table 3.81  It indicates that the primary judgment 
shaping popular legitimacy is the procedural justice of court actions.  
The second important factor is the accuracy of verdicts.  The 
 
77 A bivariate correlation represents the degree to which two items relate to each other.  
The correlation is represented by the ―Pearson’s r‖ statistic and ranges from -1 to +1.  
Correlations close to +1 and to -1 are stronger whereas correlations close to zero are weaker.  
Positive correlations indicate that an increase in one item is accompanied by an increase in 
the second item (for example, weight and height).  Negative correlations indicate that an 
increase in one item is accompanied by a decrease in the second item.  See LAWLESS ET AL., 
supra note 68, at 298–99. 
78 The correlation between these constructs was r = 0.02, which suggests that there is 
virtually no association between them. 
79 R = 0.31, p < .001.  A p-value is a statistic that determines the likelihood that the 
correlation observed is the result of chance.  A correlation is ―statistically significant‖ if the 
likelihood of seeing it by chance is 5% or less (as indicated by the p-value as p < 0.05).  See 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 460, 485 n.117 (2003). 
80 R = 0.07, p < .01.  We note that when the procedural justice of the courts is 
deconstructed into four elements of procedural justice—voice, neutrality, respect, and trust—
the correlations suggest that those four elements are highly interrelated.  While people have 
distinguished among the four aspects of procedural fairness that we have outlined, they 
generally view them as being very highly related.  Hence, it is reasonable to view the fairness 
of the courts as a general judgment that combines the four elements of procedural justice. 
81 A linear regression analysis is a statistical technique used to evaluate the independent 
effects of multiple predictors, termed independent variables, on a measurable construct, 
termed a dependent variable.  See, e.g., LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 68, at 300. 
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appropriateness of sentences, however, has a much smaller 
influence.  The same is true of behaviors that are primarily shaped 
by procedural justice judgments, but in the case of legitimacy-
related behaviors, accuracy and justice played a more equal 
secondary role. 
Table 4 replicates the analysis of Table 3 but with a differentiated 
procedural justice model that includes the four elements of 
procedural justice: voice, neutrality, respect, and trust.  Because 
these four elements are correlated, none will appear to have the 
strength of influence of a single indicator of procedural justice.82  
However, even within that framework, the results make clear that 
all four elements of procedural justice are distinctly important.  
Voice, neutrality, respect, and trust all shape court legitimacy, and 
are distinct from truth and substantive justice.  Interestingly, voice 
directly impacts behavior, while trust shapes attitudes, and 
neutrality and respect influence both attitudes and behaviors. 
Causal modeling can be used to answer the question of whether 
fair procedures shape legitimacy because people think they lead to 
accuracy and substantive justice.83  The results of that modeling are 
shown in Figure 2, which tests the conceptual model shown in 
Figure 1.84  The results suggest two conclusions.  First, part of the 
influence of procedural justice on perceptions of legitimacy comes 
from the belief that fair procedures lead to more accurate verdicts.  
And, to a much lesser degree, following fair procedures is linked to 
the belief that using fair procedures leads to punishing 
appropriately.  These influences are distinct. 
Further, the results suggest that the primary influence of 
procedural justice on legitimacy is direct.  In other words, the use of 
just procedures led to perceived legitimacy directly as well as 
through shaping either the likelihood of producing truth or the 
likelihood of achieving substantive justice. 
 
82 This is because the explanatory power on the dependent variable is, in a sense, spread 
across the correlated point estimates instead of being concentrated in just one of them.  For a 
more detailed explanation, see LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 68, at 326–27. 
83 Causal modeling, sometimes referred to as a path analysis, is a form of statistical 
regression that focuses on the causal relationship among several independent variables and 
an independent variable.  For a detailed discussion, see Rueben M. Baron & David A. Kenny, 
The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological Research: Conceptual, 
Strategic, and Statistical Considerations, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1173, 1174 
(1986). 
84 The coefficient values in the second model represent the effects of each variable on 
another variable. 
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A.  Sources of Legitimacy 
Demographics.  As seen in Table 5, respondent demographics 
have very little influence upon whether the courts are viewed as 
achieving truth.  They have more influence upon whether the courts 
are viewed as achieving substantive justice.  Higher education and 
liberalism are the primary factors that lead to saying that the 
courts do not achieve substantive justice.  In the case of procedural 
justice having higher income, being better educated and being older 
leads people to say that the courts are procedurally fair, while 
minorities and liberals say they are not. 
Personal experience.  Only a small group of those interviewed—
139 participants, which is 9% of the sample—had recent personal 
experience with the courts.  Those respondents evaluated the 
procedural justice of their experiences and, as revealed in Table 6, 
their judgments were highly correlated.  Among that subset of 
respondents the estimated accuracy of court verdicts and judgments 
about whether the courts generally obtain substantive justice are 
influenced by whether participants perceived judges as making fair 
decisions using fair procedures during their own personal 
experiences.  Perceived court procedural justice was shaped by both 
whether judges make decisions justly and whether they treated the 
person fairly during their recent personal experience. 
VIII.  DISCUSSION 
Is the establishment of truth the same thing as the attainment of 
justice?  The findings of this study suggest not.  These two goals are 
distinct.  As the summary model shown in Figure 2 suggests, truth 
does not influence perceptions of legitimacy by shaping judgments 
about just punishment.  Rather, truth and substantive justice have 
parallel influences on perceptions of legitimacy, with truth having a 
stronger direct influence. 
While both the extent to which the courts are perceived to 
determine truth and the frequency with which they achieve 
substantive justice shape popular legitimacy, neither is the primary 
factor shaping popular legitimacy.  It is the perceived fairness of 
legal procedures that drives popular legitimacy, with people 
reacting both to whether they believe decisions are fairly made and 
whether they think that litigants are fairly treated.  That influence 
occurs directly, rather than because people think fair procedures 
lead to accuracy or produce substantive justice. 
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A judicial authority can determine truth using legal procedures 
such as a trial.  This study suggests that popular legitimacy is first 
based upon the view that the courts do establish truth.  A judicial 
authority with expertise and experience can also establish a fair 
sentence.85  Hence, having a third party authority facilitate a 
socially superior form of resolution—that is, just punishment—is 
less likely to create bad feelings and undermine long-term 
relationships.  People are less likely to act upon self-serving 
motivations when a legitimate authority is telling them in a clear 
manner what a fair punishment is.  Several findings support this 
argument from people who view the courts as legitimate when they 
justly punish. 
The other key to success as a judicial authority, however, is 
relational: people are willing to defer to the solutions an authority 
proposes in part because the authority acts in ways that validate 
the parties by showing respect for their status and standing in the 
group, displaying concern for their views, and expressing a desire to 
do what is right for the people with whom they are dealing.  
Relational elements are distinct from the nature and quality of the 
decision itself and are a separate aspect of procedural justice related 
to the parties’ social link with the authority. 
This study first finds support for the direct relationship between 
procedural justice and legitimacy found in prior studies.  It then 
demonstrates it is interpersonal treatment that is the key element 
of procedural justice, which shapes perceptions of legitimacy.  In 
other words, while one benefit of fair judicial procedures is they lead 
to the goals of truth and substantive justice, it is the relational 
elements of procedures that are most central to public trust and 
confidence in the courts. 
Interestingly, trust in the motives of judicial authorities is 
primarily linked to assessments of truth, which are the most 
important goal-based influence on legitimacy.  When people 
evaluate whether or not they believe that the courts are able to 
determine the truth, it is the integrity of judges that is central, not 
the nature of the legal procedures they enact.  People see truth as 
arising from the intentions and motives of judicial actors. 
Of course, judicial procedures also involve decision-making and 
respondents viewed decision-making concerning punishment as 
linked to issues of voice and neutrality.  If the courts allow 
 
85 See THIBAULT & WALKER, supra note 21, at 117–18. 
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participants to have a voice in the proceedings and make decisions 
in rule-based, impartial ways, people believe the courts will enact 
substantive justice.  However, this influence is secondary in 
importance. 
A.  Relational Perspectives on Judicial Authority 
The courts have the responsibility for articulating appropriate 
solutions to conflicts and just punishments for rule breaking.  To be 
successful in their role, both individuals as judges and the courts as 
institutions need legitimacy.  The findings reported here reflect the 
views of a sample of Americans about the general operation of the 
courts, their popular legitimacy, and the effect of personal 
experiences with the courts among a small segment of the 
population with recent personal experience with the courts.  They 
suggest that there is an important role for relational mechanisms in 
creating and maintaining court legitimacy and encouraging 
supportive behavior toward the courts. 
Discussions of regulation by the courts often quickly move toward 
a focus on sanctions.  However, beyond the ability of legal 
authorities to compel obedience is their capacity to encourage 
voluntary deference and the willing acceptance of legal authority.  
One way the courts can encourage such acceptance is by being 
viewed by the public as legitimate.  And as the results reported 
suggest, legitimacy is enhanced when people believe that the courts 
can establish the truth of the matter and can enact substantive 
justice.  However, this is not the primary driver of legitimacy.  
Instead, that primary driver is a direct influence of the fairness of 
judicial procedures and, in particular, of the quality of the 
treatment that people experience when dealing with legal 
authorities.86 
While the concept of procedural justice is abstract, the findings of 
this study suggest more specific details about the issues defining 
the interpersonal aspects of fairness to the public.  In particular, 
people are concerned about whether they are treated with dignity, 
courtesy, and respect when dealing with legal authorities.  This 
 
86 Such findings are by no means confined to studies of legal authority.  Tom Tyler, Avital 
Mentovich, and Sagarika Satyavada recently identified similar concerns in a study of why 
people accept doctors recommendations.  See Tom Tyler et al., What Motivates Adherence to 
Medical Recommendations? The Procedural Justice Approach to Gaining Deference in the 
Medical Arena, REG. & GOVERNANCE (published online 2013), http://goo.gl/lziqAd. 
1095_TYLER AND SEVIER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/8/2014  1:02 AM 
1130 Albany Law Review [Vol. 77.3 
 
reflects both a concern for evidence of inclusion in the community, 
status within it, and respect for rights as a citizen.  Such dignitary 
concerns are central to people’s identity-based connection to legal 
authorities and institutions.  In addition, people focus upon whether 
or not they have trust in the motives of legal authorities, believing 
that they are sincere, benevolent and caring.  Those motives are 
manifested in taking the concerns of the people involved seriously, 
and trying to find solutions that address those concerns and 
recognizing their needs in the situation. 
These results suggest the desirability of broadening the 
conception of judicial authority that is typical of discussions of 
judging today.  In addition to concerns about communicating the 
ability to determine truth and achieve substantive justice, judges 
have a great deal to gain from focusing upon building relational 
bonds with the people who come before them in court, as well as 
with the public more generally.  Building such bonds has many 
benefits, but the particularly relevant issue here is their ability to 
build legitimacy, and through it enhance the authority of the courts. 
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Table 1.  Judgments About the Courts 
 Accurate 
verdicts 
Just 
sentences 
Procedural 
justice 
Decision 
making 
Fairness of 
treatment 
Achieve 
accurate 
verdicts 
—     
Enact just 
sentences 
0.04 —    
Act through 
procedural 
justice 
0.31*** 0.13*** —   
Make 
decision 
justly 
0.27*** 0.15*** 0.95*** —  
Treat people 
fairly 
0.32*** 0.10*** 0.98*** 0.89*** — 
Entries are the correlation among indicators.  *p< .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
Table 2.  Legitimacy: Supportive Attitudes and Behaviors 
 Attitudes Anticipated behaviors 
 Legitimate Lawful Share 
community 
values 
Would 
help 
Would not 
engage in 
violence 
Legitimate —     
Lawful 0.61*** —    
Share 
community 
values 
0.63*** 0.73*** —   
Would help 
the courts 
0.19*** 0.21*** 0.20*** —  
Would not 
engage in 
violence 
0.28*** 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.22*** — 
Entries are the correlation among indicators.  *p< .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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Table 3.  Factors Shaping Court Related Attitudes and 
Behaviors 
 Attitudes Behaviors 
 
Courts 
legitimate 
Courts 
lawful 
Courts share 
community 
values 
Total 
legitimacy 
Would 
help 
Would not 
use 
violence 
Total 
behavior 
Courts make 
decisions fairly 
0.13** 0.28*** 0.05 0.18*** 0.17** 0.20*** 0.23*** 
Courts treat 
people fairly 
0.28*** 0.29*** 0.52*** 0.42*** 0.17** 0.01 0.11 
Courts reach 
accurate 
verdicts 
0.40*** 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.05 0.13*** 0.05 
Courts enact 
just 
punishments 
0.06** 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.14*** 
Adjusted R-sq. 43%*** 36%*** 40%*** 48%*** 13%*** 7%*** 15%*** 
This table shows the results of an OLS regression in which the terms are all entered at the 
same time.  The entries in each column are standardized regression coefficients.  The final 
entry is the adjusted R-square for all the variables in the equation.  *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < 
.001. 
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Table 4.  The Importance of Different Aspects of Procedural 
Justice 
 Courts 
legitimate 
Courts 
lawful 
Courts 
share 
community 
values 
Total 
attitudes 
Would 
help 
Would 
not use 
violence 
Total 
behaviors 
Voice 0.06 0.08* 0.01 0.06 0.08* 0.14*** 0.07** 
Neutrality 0.09 0.26*** 0.06 0.16*** 0.08 0.03 0.10* 
Respect 0.17** 0.17** 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.17* 0.05 0.07 
Trust 0.11* 0.07 0.26*** 0.17*** 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Courts 
determine 
truth 
0.40*** 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.05 0.13*** 0.04 
Courts 
achieve 
justice 
0.05** 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.13*** 
 43%*** 36%*** 40%*** 48%*** 13%*** 7%*** 15%*** 
This table shows the results of an OLS regression in which the terms are all entered at the 
same time.  The entries in each column are standardized regression coefficients.  The final 
entry is the adjusted R-square for all the variables in the equation.  *p< .05; **p < .01; ***p < 
.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1095_TYLER AND SEVIER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/8/2014  1:02 AM 
1134 Albany Law Review [Vol. 77.3 
 
Table 5.  Demographic Influences on Judgments About the 
Courts 
 Courts 
determine truth 
Courts achieve 
justice 
Courts function using 
fair procedures 
Hispanic 0.04 -.06* -.01 
African-
American 
0.03 0.03 -.08** 
Age -.10*** 0.08** 0.18*** 
Education -.09** -.09*** 0.08** 
Income 0.03 0.08** 0.12*** 
Gender -.05* -.05* 0.03 
Party 0.05 -.34*** -.06* 
 2%*** 13%*** 8%*** 
This table shows the results of an OLS regression in which the terms are all entered at the 
same time.  The entries in each column are standardized regression coefficients.  The final 
entry is the adjusted R-square for all the variables in the equation.  *p< .05; **p < .01; ***p < 
.001. 
Table 6.  Judgments About Personal Experience with the 
Courts 
   
Procedural justice of 
decision making  
  
Fairness of treatment 
 
0.79***  
Lawfulness of decision 0.83*** 0.70*** 
Entries are the correlation among indicators.  *p< .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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Table 7. Influence of Personal Experience on Overall 
Judgments About the Courts. 
 Courts reach 
accurate 
verdicts 
Courts enact 
appropriate 
sentences 
Court act 
through 
procedural 
justice 
Judgments about what 
happened in past personal 
experiences 
   
Procedural justice of decision 
making 
0.34* 0.61*** 0.30* 
Procedural justice of quality 
of treatment 
0.10 0.40** 0.29* 
Lawfulness of court decisions 0.04 0.09 0.16 
Adjusted R-square 13%*** 10%*** 47%*** 
This table shows the results of an OLS regression in which the terms are all entered at the 
same time.  The entries in each column are standardized regression coefficients.  The final 
entry is the adjusted R-square for all the variables in the equation.  *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < 
.001. 
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Figure 1.  Conceptual Model 
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Figure 2.  Empirical Model 
 
 
